We develop a two-period model to investigate the trade-in service in a closed-loop supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer. In the supply chain, we consider two options for the trade-in service. The first one is Scenario M, in which the manufacturer collects the used products from trade-in customers by herself; and the second one is Scenario R, in which the manufacturer outsources the trade-in service to the retailer and obtains the used products from the retailer at a buy-back price. Accordingly, the firm in charge of the service needs to determine a rebate rate. We show that both firms prefer to operate the trade-in service by themselves in most cases, and we derive the condition for each firm to prefer a scenario and also the condition under which the supply chain is better off from a scenario. Compared to Scenario M, trade-in customers can enjoy lower prices in two periods in Scenario R, although the second-period sales price for new customers is higher. We also perform a numerical study to investigate the impacts of major parameters on the optimal prices, rebate rate, profits, and the conditions for each firm’s and the supply chain’s scenario preferences. The difference between trade-in prices in the two scenarios is larger when trade-in customers are more sensitive to the price, whereas the difference becomes smaller when the manufacturer obtains a higher net gain from handling returned products.

我们开发了一个两期模型来研究由制造商和零售商组成的闭环供应链中的以旧换新服务。在供应链中，我们考虑以旧换新服务的两种选择。第一个是场景M，制造商自己从以旧换新客户那里收集使用过的产品；第二种是场景R，制造商将折价服务外包给零售商，并以回购价格从零售商处获得使用过的产品。因此，负责服务的公司需要确定回扣率。我们表明，在大多数情况下，两家公司都更喜欢自己经营以旧换新服务，我们推导出每个公司更喜欢一种情景的条件，以及供应链从情景中变得更好的条件。与场景 M 相比，以旧换新的客户在场景R中可以享受两个时期更低的价格，尽管新客户的第二时期销售价格更高。我们还进行了一项数值研究，以研究主要参数对最优价格、回扣率、利润以及每个公司和供应链情景偏好的条件的影响。当以旧换新客户对价格更敏感时，两种情况下的以旧换新价格差异较大，而当制造商从处理退货产品中获得更高的净收益时，差异变得更小。以及每个公司和供应链的情景偏好的条件。当以旧换新客户对价格更敏感时，两种情况下的以旧换新价格差异较大，而当制造商从处理退货产品中获得更高的净收益时，差异变得更小。以及每个公司和供应链的情景偏好的条件。当以旧换新客户对价格更敏感时，两种情况下的以旧换新价格差异较大，而当制造商从处理退货产品中获得更高的净收益时，差异变得更小。