We find strong evidence that when a firm's customer base is more concentrated, the firm's CEO receives more risk-taking incentives in her compensation package. This finding is robust to numerous alternative measures, alternative specifications, alternative subsamples, and different attempts that mitigate endogeneity concerns. Further, the positive effect of customer concentration on CEO risk-taking incentive provision is more prominent when the CEO is more reluctant to take risks, when the firm has more investment opportunities, and when the firm is more prone to the costs of losing large customers. These findings are consistent with the notion that boards provide additional risk-taking incentives to offset the CEO's aversion to the risk of non-diversified revenue streams, thereby preventing excessive managerial conservatism at the expense of value maximization.

我们发现强有力的证据表明，当一家公司的客户群更加集中时，该公司的 CEO 在其薪酬方案中会获得更多的冒险激励。这一发现对于许多替代措施、替代规范、替代子样本以及减轻内生性问题的不同尝试都是稳健的。此外，当CEO更不愿意承担风险，当公司有更多的投资机会，当公司更容易承担失去大客户的成本时，客户集中度对CEO风险承担激励提供的积极作用更加突出。 . 这些发现与董事会提供额外的冒险激励以抵消 CEO 对非多元化收入流风险的厌恶的观点一致，