Abstract

Contrary to Lewis (1981) and Vihvelin (2013), I argue that free will in a deterministic world is an ability to break a law of nature or to change the remote past. Even if it were true, as Lewis and Vihvelin think, that an agent who is predetermined to perform a particular act might not break a law or change the remote past by doing otherwise, it would nevertheless be true that he is able to do otherwise only if he is able to break a law or to change the remote past.

中文翻译：

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确定性世界中的自由必须是什么

摘要

与 Lewis (1981) 和 Vihvelin (2013) 相反，我认为在确定性世界中的自由意志是一种打破自然法则或改变遥远过去的能力。即使像 Lewis 和 Vihvelin 认为的那样，一个预先决定执行特定行为的代理人可能不会违反法律或通过其他方式改变遥远的过去，但他只能以其他方式做如果他能够违反法律或改变遥远的过去。