Do international reputational concerns constrain governments’ economic policy choices? We assess this question by analyzing emerging market decisions to tighten restrictions on capital outflows. While policymakers should be more likely to tighten restrictions to protect their economies as capital flow volatility (CFV) increases, investors view outflow controls as heterodox policies that violate investment contracts. We argue that the effect of CFV on outflow controls depends on the use of controls in peer markets. When peers are open, governments anticipate that controls will come at a high cost to their market reputations as heterodox measures send a negative signal to investors among a crowd of liberal peers. Conversely, when peers are closed, using controls should do less damage to an economy’s reputation. For 25 emerging markets from 1995–2015, we show that CFV is associated with outflow controls, but only when market peers are already closed, suggesting reputational concerns can limit policy autonomy.

国际声誉问题是否限制了政府的经济政策选择？我们通过分析新兴市场收紧资本外流限制的决定来评估这个问题。尽管随着资本流动波动性（CFV）的增加，政策制定者应该更有可能收紧限制以保护其经济，但投资者将流出控制视为违反投资合同的非正统政策。我们认为 CFV 对流出控制的影响取决于对等市场控制的使用。当同行开放时，政府预计控制措施将以其市场声誉为代价，因为非正统措施向一群自由同行中的投资者发出负面信号。相反，当同行关闭时，使用控制对经济体声誉的损害应该较小。对于 1995 年至 2015 年的 25 个新兴市场，