This work focuses on firms that sell perishable products to risk-averse strategic consumers over two periods: the full-price period and the clearance period. The risk-aversion level of strategic consumers affects their expected utility in both periods, which will determine their purchasing behaviour. Typically, firms implement either quantity commitment (QC), price commitment (PC) or rational-expectation equilibrium (REE) policies to plan for risk-averse strategic consumers’ purchasing behaviour. In this study, we develop and analyze a novel model on the sales policy, full price, and the initial inventory decisions in the above setting. Results show that the risk-aversion level of strategic consumers has structural implications on optimal policies. First, firms should implement QC when the risk-aversion level is higher than a critical threshold; otherwise, PC is better. Second, the critical threshold of risk aversion increases as the unit cost of a product and clearance price decrease and as the consumer valuation increases. This can affect the optimal policy (QC, PC or REE). Finally, PC is always optimal when strategic consumers are risk seeking. We also conclude that the optimal policy is significantly affected by the proportion of strategic consumers when we consider different kinds of consumers (e.g. myopic consumers).

这项工作的重点是在两个时期向规避风险的战略消费者销售易腐烂产品的公司：全价期和清仓期。战略消费者的风险规避水平影响他们在两个时期的预期效用，这将决定他们的购买行为。通常，公司实施数量承诺 (QC)、价格承诺 (PC) 或理性预期均衡 (REE) 政策来规划规避风险的战略消费者的购买行为。在本研究中，我们开发并分析了上述设置中有关销售政策、全价和初始库存决策的新模型。结果表明，战略消费者的风险规避水平对最优政策具有结构性影响。第一，当风险规避水平高于临界阈值时，企业应实施质量控制；否则，PC 更好。其次，风险规避的临界阈值随着产品单位成本和清仓价格的降低以及消费者估值的增加而增加。这会影响最佳策略（QC、PC 或 REE）。最后，当战略消费者寻求风险时，PC 始终是最佳选择。我们还得出结论，当我们考虑不同类型的消费者（例如近视消费者）时，最优策略受战略消费者比例的显着影响。