We investigate the structure of mutual funds’ corporate governance preferences as revealed by how they vote their shares in portfolio companies. We apply unsupervised learning tools from the machine learning literature to analyze mutual funds’ votes and find that a parsimonious two-dimensional model can explain the bulk of mutual fund voting. The dimensions capture competing visions of corporate governance and are related to the leading proxy advisors’ recommendations. Cluster analysis shows that mutual funds are organized into three “parties” — the Traditional Governance Party, Shareholder Reform Party, and Shareholder Protest Party — that follow distinctive philosophies of corporate governance and shareholders’ role.

中文翻译：

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共同基金的党派结构

我们调查了共同基金公司治理偏好的结构，正如他们如何投票所投资的公司股份所揭示的那样。我们应用机器学习文献中的无监督学习工具来分析共同基金的投票，并发现简约的二维模型可以解释大部分共同基金投票。这些维度捕捉了公司治理的竞争愿景，并与领先的代理顾问的建议相关。聚类分析表明，共同基金组织成三个“政党”——传统治理党、股东改革党和股东抗议党——遵循独特的公司治理理念和股东角色。