Instead of attacking their adversaries directly, states often do so indirectly by supporting rebel groups. While these support relationships vary considerably, existing research lacks a comprehensive account thereof. To explain states’ choice of support, we suggest differentiating between two modes of support relationships according to the control opportunities they offer states over rebels: while delegation enables “hands-on” control, “hands-off” orchestration allows for plausible deniability and does not harm rebels’ local legitimacy. We argue that sponsors prefer orchestration when “hands-on” control can be substituted by goal alignment or competition; and they prefer delegation when the conflict is highly salient. Tests using global data for the period 1975-2009 support the first two expectations. Surprisingly, states’ capabilities also render “hands-off” orchestration more likely. The paper advances the understanding of external rebel support by transferring insights from indirect governance theory to the study of indirect wars and putting it to statistical test.

国家通常不直接攻击他们的对手，而是通过支持反叛团体间接地这样做。虽然这些支持关系差异很大，但现有研究缺乏对其的全面描述。为了解释国家对支持的选择，我们建议根据它们为国家提供对反叛者的控制机会来区分两种支持关系模式：虽然授权可以实现“动手”控制，但“不干涉”编排允许合理的否认，并且不损害反叛者的地方合法性。我们认为，当“动手”控制可以被目标对齐或竞争取代时，赞助商更喜欢协调；当冲突非常突出时，他们更喜欢授权。使用 1975-2009 年期间的全球数据进行的测试支持前两个预期。出奇，国家的能力也使“不干涉”的编排更有可能。本文通过将间接治理理论的见解转移到对间接战争的研究并对其进行统计检验，促进了对外部反叛支持的理解。