Abstract

There is a tension in the doctrine of intertemporal law outlined by Max Huber in the Island of Palmas case. The first branch demands that the legality of an act be judged by the law in force at the time the act occurs; the second that we take into account any change in the law over time. We see the problem in the 2019 Chagos Archipelago proceedings. The UK argued that the detachment of the Archipelago from Mauritius in 1965 was not unlawful, because it was not regarded as unlawful at the time. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) disagreed, deciding that the detachment was unlawful at that time, but it relied on the 1970 Declaration on Friendly Relations to confirm this conclusion. This article explains why the ICJ’s use of dynamic logic to reach its decision was correct—and what this tells us about the intertemporal doctrine.

中文翻译：

---

重新审视跨期法学说

摘要

Max Huber 在帕尔马斯岛案中概述的跨期法学说存在紧张关系。第一个分支要求行为的合法性以行为发生时有效的法律为准；第二，我们考虑到随着时间的推移法律的任何变化。我们在 2019 年查戈斯群岛诉讼程序中看到了这个问题。英国辩称，1965 年将群岛从毛里求斯撤出并不违法，因为当时并未将其视为非法。国际法院（ICJ）不同意，当时认为该分遣队是非法的，但它依靠 1970 年的《友好关系宣言》证实了这一结论。这篇文章解释了为什么国际法院使用动态逻辑来做出决定是正确的——以及这告诉我们关于跨期原则的什么。