当前位置: X-MOL 学术Oxford Journal of Legal Studies › 论文详情
Our official English website, www.x-mol.net, welcomes your feedback! (Note: you will need to create a separate account there.)
Is Majority Rule Justified in Constitutional Adjudication?
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies ( IF 1.443 ) Pub Date : 2020-12-12 , DOI: 10.1093/ojls/gqaa055
Cristóbal Caviedes 1
Affiliation  

In this article, I challenge the use of a majority voting rule (majority rule) to declare statutes unconstitutional in many constitutional courts. To do this, I briefly present four main features of majority rule and assess whether these features (separately and jointly considered) provide definitive reasons for using this voting rule over others in constitutional adjudication. I conclude that these features do not provide such reasons either individually or taken together. This conclusion enables one to analyse whether constitutional courts should use other voting rules in constitutional adjudication, such as supermajority rules.

中文翻译:

宪法裁决中的多数原则是否合理?

在本文中,我质疑在许多宪法法院中使用多数表决规则(多数规则)宣布法规违宪。为此,我简要介绍了多数规则的四个主要特征,并评估这些特征(单独和共同考虑)是否为在宪法裁决中使用此投票规则而不是其他规则提供了明确的理由。我的结论是,无论是单独的还是综合的,这些特征都不能提供这样的理由。这一结论使人们能够分析宪法法院是否应该在宪法裁决中使用其他投票规则,例如绝对多数规则。
更新日期:2020-12-12
down
wechat
bug