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When Vertical is Horizontal: How Vertical Mergers Lead to Increases in “Effective Concentration”
Review of Industrial Organization ( IF 1.313 ) Pub Date : 2021-07-23 , DOI: 10.1007/s11151-021-09827-w
Serge Moresi 1 , Steven C. Salop 2
Affiliation  

This article explains the inherent loss of an indirect competitor and reduction in competition when a vertical merger raises input foreclosure concerns. We then calculate a measure of the effective increase in the HHI measure of concentration for the downstream market, and we refer to this “proxy” measure as the “dHHI.” We derive the dHHI measure by comparing the pricing incentives and associated upward pricing pressure (“UPP”) that are involved in two alternative types of acquisitions: (1) vertical mergers that raise unilateral input foreclosure concerns (and the associated vertical GUPPI measures); and (2) horizontal acquisitions of partial ownership interests among competitors that raise unilateral effects concerns (and the associated modified GUPPI and modified HHI measures). This dHHI measure can be a useful tool for vertical merger analysis.



中文翻译:

当垂直是水平时:垂直合并如何导致“有效集中度”增加

本文解释了当垂直合并引起输入止赎问题时间接竞争对手的固有损失和竞争的减少。然后,我们计算下游市场集中度HHI度量有效增加的度量,我们将此“代理”度量称为“ dHHI”。我们推导出dHHI通过比较两种替代类型的收购所涉及的定价激励和相关的上行定价压力 (“UPP”) 来衡量:(1) 引起单边输入止赎问题的纵向合并(以及相关的纵向 GUPPI 措施);(2) 横向收购竞争对手之间的部分所有权权益,从而引起单方面影响问题(以及相关的修改后的 GUPPI 和修改后的 HHI 措施)。这种dHHI度量可以成为垂直合并分析的有用工具。

更新日期:2021-07-23
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