The decline of the U.S. manufacturing share since 1960 has occurred disproportionately during recessions. Using evidence from two natural experiments—the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008 and U.S. interstate banking deregulation in the 1980s—I find a role for credit reallocation in explaining this phenomenon by showing that losing access to credit disproportionately hurt manufacturing firms, and that the creation of new credit disproportionately benefited nonmanufacturing firms. These results arise endogenously from a model with technology-driven structural change and fixed costs of establishing new financial relationships. The model suggests an important role for long-run industry trajectories in properly accounting for the costs and benefits of policy interventions in credit markets.

自 1960 年以来，美国制造业份额的下降在经济衰退期间发生得不成比例。使用来自两个自然实验的证据——2008 年雷曼兄弟倒闭和 1980 年代美国州际银行业放松管制——我发现信贷重新分配在解释这一现象方面发挥了作用，表明失去获得信贷的机会对制造企业造成了不成比例的伤害，以及创造的新信贷不成比例地使非制造业公司受益。这些结果源于一个具有技术驱动的结构变化和建立新财务关系的固定成本的模型。该模型表明，长期行业轨迹在正确考虑信贷市场政策干预的成本和收益方面发挥着重要作用。