This study considers the doctor-optimal stable mechanism in a matching-with-contract model (a doctor-hospital match, for instance). We show that, whenever the doctor-optimal stable mechanism exists, the mechanism is group strategy-proof if and only if it is efficient if and only if it is Maskin monotonic, all from the doctors’ side. Moreover, with substitutes and the law of aggregate demand, we find that the mechanism is consistent if and only if it is efficient.

中文翻译：

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合约匹配中的等价定理

本研究考虑了匹配合同模型（例如，医生-医院匹配）中的医生最优稳定机制。我们表明，无论何时存在医生最优稳定机制，当且仅当它是有效的当且仅当它是 Maskin 单调机制时，该机制是群策略证明的，所有这些都是从医生的角度来看的。此外，通过替代品和总需求定律，我们发现该机制是一致的，当且仅当它是有效的。