Purpose

The purpose of this paper is to analyse a key research hypothesis: Do firms ruled by managers have a greater rationale to implement a mergers and acquisitions (M&A) than (family) firms managed by their owners?

Design/methodology/approach

This paper uses an organizational-delegation-quantity oligopoly game to examine the profitability of M&As for firms that strategically delegate production decisions to managers versus family firms with no strategic delegation. This paper delimits the condition for delegation as aimed at increasing merger profitability: non-family CEOs will implement mergers more frequently than family CEOs and more so for inefficient firms because these require fewer synergies. The paper tests the main propositions with data on all M&As by small and medium firms in Spain in 2017 and 2018.

Findings

The greater the average operating margin of a firm, the more likely a merger, which is also more likely between non-family firms. The evidence of higher ex post synergies by firms is not statistically significant due to large variability, suggesting that some family firms did not obtain the expected ex ante synergies. The lesson is that family firms competing in an environment of high marginal costs (e.g. industries in the early stage of the life cycle) seeking to grow through inorganic means such as M&As have an incentive to professionalize management.

Research limitations/implications

This paper models competition in a Cournot fashion, representative of industries where firms compete in terms of sales growth and increased market share. Other results might hold in industries where firms are oriented to price competition or to service differentiation. The empirical research uses proxies for key variables such as the form of firm governance and unit costs, while hypotheses on ex ante synergies driving merger decisions had to be tested through ex post synergies.

Originality/value

M&As by small firms and family firms remain largely unexplored in the literature. This paper contributes with both a theoretical model and empirical research that highlight the implications of strategic delegation contracts for M&A deals.

中文翻译：

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家族企业和管理代表团的合并：古诺模型和西班牙的经验证据

目的

本文的目的是分析一个关键的研究假设：由管理者统治的公司是否比由其所有者管理的（家族）公司更有理由实施并购 (M&A)？

设计/方法/方法

本文使用组织-委托-数量寡头博弈来检验将生产决策战略性地委托给经理的公司与没有战略委托的家族企业的并购的盈利能力。本文界定了旨在提高并购盈利能力的授权条件：非家族 CEO 将比家族 CEO 更频繁地实施兼并，对于低效率的公司更是如此，因为它们需要较少的协同效应。本文用 2017 年和 2018 年西班牙中小型企业的所有并购数据检验了主要命题。

发现

一家公司的平均营业利润率越高，合并的可能性就越大，在非家族企业之间也更有可能发生合并。由于存在较大的可变性，公司更高的事后协同效应的证据在统计上并不显着，这表明一些家族企业没有获得预期的事前协同效应。经验教训是，在边际成本高的环境中竞争的家族企业（例如，处于生命周期早期阶段的行业）寻求通过并购等无机方式实现增长，有动力实现专业化管理。

研究限制/影响

本文以古诺方式模拟竞争，代表公司在销售增长和市场份额增加方面进行竞争的行业。其他结果可能适用于企业以价格竞争或服务差异化为导向的行业。实证研究使用诸如公司治理形式和单位成本等关键变量的代理，而关于推动合并决策的事前协同效应的假设必须通过事后协同效应进行检验。

原创性/价值

小企业和家族企业的并购在文献中基本上没有得到探索。本文提供了一个理论模型和实证研究，突出了战略委托合同对并购交易的影响。