abstract:

This paper focuses on a neglected portion of Plato's Gorgias from 506c to 513d during Socrates's discussion with Callicles. I claim that Callicles adopts the view that virtue lies in self-preservation in this part of the dialogue. Such a position allows him to assert the value of rhetoric in civic life by appealing not to the goodness of acting unjustly with impunity, but to the badness of suffering unjustly without remedy. On this view, the benefits of the life of rhetoric depend on the idea that virtue consists in the power to protect oneself from the predations of others. I argue that by challenging this understanding of virtue as self-preservation, Socrates both deprives Callicles of any remaining justification for the rhetorical life in the Gorgias and, at the same time, makes room for his own defense of the life of philosophy.

摘要：

本文重点关注柏拉图的《高尔吉亚篇》从 506c 到 513d 在苏格拉底与卡里克勒斯的讨论中被忽视的部分。我声称，在对话的这一部分，卡里克勒斯采用了美德在于自我保护的观点。这样的立场使他能够通过诉诸不公正行为而不受惩罚的好处，而是诉诸没有补救办法而遭受不公正痛苦的坏处，从而断言修辞在公民生活中的价值。根据这种观点，修辞生活的好处取决于这样一种观念，即美德在于保护自己免受他人掠夺的能力。我认为，通过挑战这种将美德视为自我保护的理解，苏格拉底既剥夺了卡里克勒斯在高尔吉亚中的修辞生活的任何剩余理由 同时，也为他自己对哲学生活的辩护腾出了空间。