Reviewed by:

• Cicero on the Philosophy of Religion: On the Nature of the Gods and On Divination by J. P. F. Wynne
• Harald Thorsrud

This is an outstanding contribution to the study of Cicero's philosophical works. Wynne argues for a nuanced view of De natura deorum (DND) and De divinatione (Div.) as components of Cicero's larger philosophical project, specifically revealing how Greek philosophy might serve to moderate or clarify Roman religion. In an extensive introduction, Wynne lays out his interpretative approach, adding to the growing consensus that these texts are worth reading for more than the reconstruction of lost sources. The first chapter elaborates Cicero's project in these dialogues. The central aim is to help his readers avoid the superstitious belief that the gods care more for us than they do as well as the impious belief that they care less for us than they do. So, by critically examining theological beliefs, especially regarding divine providence, readers may acquire a more intelligible and philosophically moderated approach to Roman religious practice. In chapters 2 and 3, Wynne applies his interpretative principles first to the arguments for and against Epicurean theology in DND 1, and then for and against Stoic theology in DND 2–3. Similarly, chapters 4 and 5 explore the case for and against divination in Div., effectively clearing up some longstanding interpretative puzzles along the way. In chapter 6, Wynne argues that Cicero gestures toward his own view on these matters: Roman religious practice can indeed be better understood as expressing certain key elements of Stoic theology, though the orthodox Stoic account of divination requires modification. In keeping with the radical Academic skepticism that Wynne attributes to him, Cicero does not accept this view as true, or even more probably true than alternative accounts; it is strictly how things appear to him at the close of the dialogues. [End Page 513]

Anyone interested in Hellenistic philosophy, or the history of Roman culture and religion, will find many rewarding insights here, along with a greater understanding of and appreciation for Cicero's literary, philosophical work. I could go on at length detailing the virtues of the book but will devote the remainder of this review to a critical point.

Wynne acknowledges the complexity of the issue regarding the proper understanding of Cicero's skepticism but decides to provide only a brief justification of his preference for the radical interpretation, as a full defense would take him outside the scope of the book (35–40). On Wynne's radical view, the Academic avoids committing errors by suspending judgment, "keeping chaste his ardor for unreachable truth" (38). Nevertheless, the radical skeptic follows whatever appears plausible or truth-like and may even hold views (though not beliefs insofar as that involves taking something to be true or probably true).

Let us suppose that Cicero succeeded in the radical aim Wynne attributes to him, namely of balancing the cases for and against divination and the nature of the gods in order to promote suspension of judgment on the crucial issue of the gods' providence (71; DND 1.14; Div. 1.7), even though it is worth noting that this is not explicitly asserted in either DND 1.14 or Div. 1.7. But if so, it is puzzling as to why one side or the other might still seem more like the truth. If the opposing arguments are really balanced and lead us to suspend judgment, then whatever it is that nonetheless makes things seem a certain way must be some nonrational factor. For example, if the arguments for and against divine providence lead me to suspend judgment but it still seems to me that the gods care for us, this appearance must be the result of something besides the arguments, perhaps my cultural conditioning or some personal experience.

Such appearances are better understood, I believe, in terms of the nonrational affection that the Pyrrhonist relies on as a practical criterion. For the Pyrrhonist, action-guiding appearances neither arise from the...

审核人：

• 西塞罗论宗教哲学：论诸神的本性和占卜 JPF Wynne
• 哈拉尔德·托斯鲁德

这是对西塞罗哲学著作研究的杰出贡献。Wynne 主张对De natura deorum ( DND ) 和De divinatione ( Div.) 作为西塞罗更大的哲学项目的组成部分，特别揭示了希腊哲学如何可能有助于缓和或澄清罗马宗教。在一个广泛的介绍中，Wynne 阐述了他的解释方法，增加了越来越多的共识，即这些文本比重建丢失的资源更值得阅读。第一章阐述了西塞罗在这些对话中的计划。中心目标是帮助他的读者避免迷信，即诸神比他们更关心我们，以及他们比他们更关心我们的不虔诚信念。因此，通过批判性地检查神学信仰，特别是关于神的旨意，读者可能会获得一种更易理解和哲学上更温和的罗马宗教实践方法。在第 2 章和第 3 章中，DND 1，然后在DND 2-3 中支持和反对斯多葛神学。同样，第 4 章和第 5 章探讨了Div 中支持和反对占卜的案例，有效地解决了一些长期存在的解释难题。在第 6 章中，Wynne 认为西塞罗在这些问题上表明了他自己的观点：罗马宗教实践确实可以更好地理解为表达斯多葛神学的某些关键要素，尽管正统的斯多葛派占卜需要修改。与 Wynne 归因于他的激进的学术怀疑一致，西塞罗不接受这种观点是正确的，甚至比其他说法更可能是正确的。严格来说，这就是他在对话结束时出现的情况。[第513页结束]

任何对希腊哲学或罗马文化和宗教历史感兴趣的人，都会在这里找到许多有益的见解，同时对西塞罗的文学和哲学作品有更深入的理解和欣赏。我可以继续详细介绍这本书的优点，但会将本评论的其余部分用于关键点。

Wynne 承认有关正确理解西塞罗怀疑论的问题的复杂性，但决定仅简要说明他偏爱激进解释的理由，因为全面辩护将使他超出本书的范围（35-40）。在 Wynne 的激进观点中，学术界通过暂停判断来避免犯错，“对无法触及的真理保持纯洁的热情”（38）。然而，激进的怀疑论者遵循任何看似合理或类似真理的东西，甚至可能持有观点（尽管不是信仰，因为它涉及将某事视为真实或可能是真实的）。

让我们假设西塞罗成功实现了 Wynne 赋予他的激进目标，即平衡支持和反对占卜和诸神本质的案例，以促进对诸神的天意这一关键问题的判断暂停（71；DND 1.14; Div . 1.7)，尽管值得注意的是，这在DND 1.14 或Div 中都没有明确声明. 1.7. 但如果是这样，令人费解的是，为什么一侧或另一侧似乎仍然更像真相。如果相反的论点真的是平衡的，导致我们暂停判断，那么无论是什么让事情看起来像某种方式，都一定是某种非理性因素。例如，如果支持和反对天意的争论使我暂缓判断，但在我看来神仍然关心我们，那么这种出现一定是争论之外的某些东西的结果，也许是我的文化条件或某些个人经历​​。

我相信，根据皮浪主义者所依赖的非理性情感作为实践标准，可以更好地理解这种现象。对于皮浪主义者来说，动作指导的出现既不是来自...