Reviewed by:

• Kant and Animals ed. by John J. Callanan and Lucy Allais
• Gary Steiner

A well-known Kant scholar once said to me, "You know, I love to study Kant because I think he's right about everything!" While it may be unlikely that that or any other Kant scholar really believes that Kant was "right about everything," the statement reminds us that, roughly speaking, there are two kinds of philosopher: those who are fully invested in vindicating as much of Kant's thought as humanly possible, and those who are concerned that Kant's thought is in many respects the culmination of a historical line of thought that is based on some deeply troubling premises. The authors of this volume seek to span this divide but ultimately fall heavily into the former camp. This, however, does not keep this volume from being unusually informative and thought provoking. Perhaps the highest praise I can offer of it is that while I disagree with almost all of the major conclusions presented by the contributors, I nonetheless learned a great deal and gained inspiration for my own continuing work on Kant's views about nonhuman animals from reading this volume.

Attention to language can prove to be highly revealing. Arthur Ripstein and Sergio Tenenbaum present a defense of Kant's indirect duties view in which there are numerous [End Page 517] references to "the brutes" (e.g. 150, 152). One might be inclined to accept these as a benign, conventional way of referring to nonhuman animals, or one might not even take notice of such references given their ubiquity in our historical discourse about nonhuman animals. Similarly, the contributors follow the convention of distinguishing "human beings" from "animals," with the obligatory footnote indicating that, yes, human beings are animals as well, but that the human-animal shorthand is simply intended to serve the interest of linguistic economy. Near the beginning of her essay on moral responsibility for nonhuman animals, Helga Varden invokes "the obvious, assumed presumption … that humans are a kind of animal" as the rationale for the prevailing shorthand (157n1). I myself used to do this when writing about the moral status of nonhuman animals, but decided to stop doing so when I realized that this abbreviated nomenclature simply reinforces the sense that we humans are not "really" animals after all, even though we insist that we indeed are. References such as "brute" and "human versus animal" prove to be highly instructive symptoms of a global set of presuppositions about the categorical superiority of human beings over nonhuman animals that have persisted in the Western philosophical tradition since Greek antiquity. This global set of presuppositions is one embraced not only by many of the contributors to this volume, but more importantly by Kant himself. The detailed display of this set of presuppositions puts readers of this volume in a position to take their own critical stand on them as well as on the specific commitments to which they lead Kant.

In her essay on moral responsibility for animals, Varden acknowledges that moral duties are "anthropocentric in a certain sense" (160), but she maintains that the specific sense of anthropocentrism is eminently defensible inasmuch as nonhuman animals lack the rationally informed freedom requisite for being a member of the moral community (164). To the extent that nonhuman animals lack this capacity, Varden suggests, "moral duties are always directed at moral agents" (165). In this connection, Varden acknowledges Peter Singer's and Tom Regan's "anti-speciesist" efforts to challenge Kant's views, but she rejects these efforts on the grounds that the "supplied intuitions" are misguided (166). Varden devotes only a single sentence to a specific consideration of Singer's and Regan's views, so it does not become as clear as it might what these supplied intuitions are supposed to be.

Here this reader wishes the author had gone a bit deeper than Regan's "subject-of-alife" criterion to address explicitly his powerful concept of the moral patient—a notion that squarely challenges the account of the...

审核人：

• 康德和动物编辑。作者：John J. Callanan 和 Lucy Allais
• 加里·施泰纳

一位著名的康德学者曾经对我说：“你知道，我喜欢研究康德，因为我认为他在一切方面都是对的！”虽然那个人或任何其他康德学者可能不太可能真的相信康德“在所有事情上都是正确的”，但该声明提醒我们，粗略地说，有两种哲学家：那些全心全意为同样多的事情辩护的哲学家认为康德的思想是人类可能的，而那些担心康德的思想在许多方面是基于一些令人深感不安的前提的历史思想路线的顶峰的人。本书的作者试图跨越这一鸿沟，但最终陷入困境进入前阵营。然而，这并不能阻止这本书异常丰富和发人深省。也许我能给予的最高赞扬是，虽然我不同意贡献者提出的几乎所有主要结论，尽管如此，我还是从阅读本书中学到了很多东西，并为我自己继续研究康德关于非人类动物的观点的工作获得了灵感。

对语言的关注可以证明是非常具有启发性的。亚瑟·里普斯坦 (Arthur Ripstein) 和塞尔吉奥·特南鲍姆 (Sergio Tenenbaum) 为康德的间接职责观点辩护，其中有许多[End Page 517]对“野蛮人”的引用（例如 150、152）。人们可能倾向于接受这些是指代非人类动物的一种良性的、传统的方式，或者考虑到它们在我们关于非人类动物的历史论述中无处不在，人们甚至可能不会注意到这些引用。同样，贡献者遵循区分“人类”和“动物”的惯例，强制性脚注表明，是的，人类也是动物，但人类 - 动物简写只是为了服务于语言的兴趣经济。在她关于对非人类动物的道德责任的文章的开头，赫尔加·瓦尔登援引“显而易见的假设……人类是一种动物”作为流行速记 (157n1) 的基本原理。我自己在写非人类动物的道德地位时曾经这样做过，但是当我意识到这种缩写的命名法只是强化了我们人类毕竟不是“真正的”动物的感觉时，我决定停止这样做，尽管我们坚持认为我们确实是。诸如“野蛮”和“人类与动物”之类的参考文献被证明是关于人类相对于非人类动物的绝对优越性的一系列全球预设的具有高度指导意义的症状，这些预设自古希腊以来就一直存在于西方哲学传统中。这套全球性的预设不仅被本书的许多贡献者所接受，更重要的是被康德本人所接受。

在她关于动物的道德责任的文章中，瓦登承认道德责任“在某种意义上是人类中心主义的”（160），但她坚持认为人类中心主义的特殊意义是非常有道理的，因为非人类动物缺乏成为存在所必需的理性知情自由。道德共同体的成员（164）。Varden 认为，就非人类动物缺乏这种能力而言，“道德责任总是针对道德主体”（165）。在这方面，瓦尔登承认彼得辛格和汤姆里根的“反物种主义”努力挑战康德的观点，但她拒绝这些努力，理由是“提供的直觉”被误导（166）。Varden 只用了一句话来具体考虑 Singer 和 Regan 的观点，

在这里，这位读者希望作者比里根的“生命主体”标准更深入一点，以明确阐述他对道德患者的强大概念——这一概念直接挑战了……