Both leniency programs and private antitrust enforcement are essential in combating cartels. The literature demonstrates that society benefits from both increased private actions and leniency applications. However, the present view is that private enforcement discourages cartel members from seeking leniency. Proponents of this view blame follow-on civil actions in the wake of successful public antitrust enforcement cases. This concern hinders the development of private antitrust enforcement. Nevertheless, the literature that expresses such a concern fails to consider standalone civil actions’ impact. Building on a game theory model of leniency programs by Professor Joseph E. Harrington, this article reinvestigates the relationship between the two seemingly contradictory procedural devices of leniency programs and private enforcement. Considering a revised leniency game, this article reveals that incentivizing private antitrust enforcement does not necessarily discourage leniency applications. Accordingly, this article proposes ways for legislators to use private enforcement as a tool to promote leniency applications.

中文翻译：

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激励私人反垄断执法以促进宽大处理

宽大处理计划和私人反垄断执法对于打击卡特尔至关重要。文献表明，社会受益于增加的私人行为和宽大处理。然而，目前的观点是，私人执法不鼓励卡特尔成员寻求宽大处理。这种观点的支持者指责在成功的公共反垄断执法案件之后采取的后续民事行动。这种担忧阻碍了私人反垄断执法的发展。然而，表达这种担忧的文献并未考虑独立民事诉讼的影响。本文以 Joseph E. Harrington 教授的宽大处理计划博弈论模型为基础，重新研究了宽大处理计划和私人执法这两个看似矛盾的程序机制之间的关系。考虑到修改后的宽大处理游戏，本文揭示了激励私人反垄断执法并不一定会阻止宽大处理申请。因此，本文提出了立法者使用私人执法作为促进宽大申请的工具的方法。