In many real-world matching applications, there are restrictions for institutions either on priorities of their slots or on the transferability of unfilled slots over others (or both). Motivated by the need in such real-life matching problems, this paper formulates a family of practical choice rules, slot-specific priorities with capacity transfers (SSPwCT). These rules invoke both slot-specific priorities structure and transferability of vacant slots. We show that the cumulative offer mechanism (COM) is stable, strategy-proof and respects improvements with regards to SSPwCT choice rules. Transferring the capacity of one more unfilled slot, while all else is constant, leads to strategy-proof Pareto improvement of the COM. Following Kominers' (2020) formulation, we also provide comparative static results for expansion of branch capacity and addition of new contracts in the SSPwCT framework. Our results have implications for resource allocation problems with diversity considerations.

在许多现实世界的匹配应用程序中，机构对其插槽的优先级或未填充插槽的可转移性（或两者）都有限制。受此类现实生活匹配问题的需要，本文制定了一系列实用的选择规则，具有容量转移（SSPwCT）的插槽特定优先级。这些规则调用特定插槽的优先级结构和空插槽的可转移性。我们表明，累积报价机制(COM) 是稳定的、策略证明的，并且尊重关于 SSPwCT 选择规则的改进。转移一个未填充插槽的容量，而其他一切都保持不变，导致COM 的策略证明帕累托改进。遵循 Kominers (2020) 的公式，我们还提供了在 SSPwCT 框架中扩展分支机构容量和增加新合同的静态比较结果。我们的结果对考虑到多样性的资源分配问题有影响。