I study a two-period matching model where one side of the market (e.g. workers) have an option to invest and delay matching in the first period. Investment increases each agent's matching surplus in the second period, by a magnitude of the worker's investment ability in the match pair. Assuming each worker's investment ability is her private information that unfolds in the second period, I define a notion of sequential stability, and show that the set of sequentially stable outcomes is a superset of the complete information stable outcomes. Moreover, with transferable utility, as long as the cost of delay coincides on the same side of the market, efficient investment occurs in any sequentially stable outcome. When every agent shares the same cost of delay, efficient investment also occurs in any sequentially stable outcome with non-transferable utility. My analysis suggests that efficient investment is a robust prediction in sequential matching markets.

我研究了一个两期匹配模型，其中市场的一方（例如工人）可以选择投资并在第一期延迟匹配。投资使每个代理人在第二阶段的匹配盈余增加了匹配对中工人的投资能力的大小。假设每个工人的投资能力是她在第二阶段展开的私人信息，我定义了序列稳定性的概念，并证明了序列稳定结果集是完全信息稳定结果的超集。此外，对于可转移效用，只要延迟成本在市场的同一侧重合，有效投资就会发生在任何顺序稳定的结果中。当每个代理共享相同的延迟成本时，有效投资也发生在任何具有不可转移效用的连续稳定结果中。我的分析表明，在连续匹配市场中，有效投资是一个可靠的预测。