Animal ethicists have been debating the morality of speciesism for over forty years. Despite rather persuasive arguments against this form of discrimination, many philosophers continue to assign humans a higher moral status than nonhuman animals. The primary source of evidence for this position is our intuition that humans’ interests matter more than the similar interests of other animals. And it must be acknowledged that this intuition is both powerful and widespread. But should we trust it for all that? The present paper defends a negative answer to that question, based on a debunking argument. The intuitive belief that humans matter more than other animals is unjustified because it results from an epistemically defective process. It is largely shaped by tribalism, our tendency to favor ingroup members as opposed to outgroup members. And this influence is distortive for two reasons. First, tribalism evolved for reasons unrelated to moral truths; hence, it would at best produce true moral beliefs accidentally. Second, tribalism generates a vast quantity of false moral beliefs, starting with racist beliefs. Once this intuition is discarded, little evidence remains that speciesism is morally acceptable.

四十多年来，动物伦理学家一直在争论物种主义的道德问题。尽管反对这种歧视形式的论据颇有说服力，但许多哲学家仍然认为人类比非人类动物具有更高的道德地位。这一立场的主要证据来源是我们的直觉，即人类的利益比其他动物的类似利益更重要。必须承认，这种直觉既强大又广泛。但是我们应该相信它吗？本文基于一个揭穿论点，为该问题的否定答案辩护。人类比其他动物更重要的直觉信念是不合理的，因为它是由认知缺陷过程造成的。它主要是由部落主义塑造的，我们倾向于偏爱内群体成员而不是外群体成员。这种影响是扭曲的，原因有二。首先，部落主义的进化原因与道德真理无关；因此，它最多只能偶然产生真正的道德信念。其次，从种族主义信仰开始，部落主义会产生大量错误的道德信仰。一旦这种直觉被抛弃，就几乎没有证据表明物种歧视在道德上是可以接受的。