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Evolutionary game of inland shipping pollution control under government co-supervision
Marine Pollution Bulletin ( IF 5.8 ) Pub Date : 2021-07-21 , DOI: 10.1016/j.marpolbul.2021.112730
Lang Xu 1 , Zhongjie Di 1 , Jihong Chen 2
Affiliation  

In the context of the environmental improvement of inland shipping, this paper studies the interaction mechanism of tripartite behavioral strategy selection among the upstream and downstream governments and shipping companies in neighboring provinces. This paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model that introduces the prospect theory, and verifies numerical examples in combination with system dynamics simulation methods. Therefore, this study discusses the influence of evolutionary stability strategies on the development of electric ship industry. The results show that in order to realize effective governance of inland shipping pollution, the optimal evolutionary stability strategies of the three stakeholders should be as follows: active supervision in both upstream and downstream governments, and using clean energy in shipping companies. The improvement of the initial probability and risk preference of the three parties is conducive to promoting the faster and more stable industrial development, while reasonable profit distribution coefficient and compensation cost can promote the benign development of the inland river environmental governance system. In addition, the probability of upstream and downstream governments and shipping companies choosing the optimal strategies is positively related to the government fines, and negatively related to the regulatory costs. In particular, the application of prospect theory makes the result of evolutionary equilibrium more obvious.



中文翻译:

政府共同监管下内河航运污染治理演化博弈

本文在内河航运环境改善的背景下,研究了上下游政府与邻省航运企业三方行为策略选择的互动机制。本文构建了引入前景理论的三方演化博弈模型,并结合系统动力学模拟方法对数值算例进行了验证。因此,本研究讨论了演化稳定性策略对电动船舶工业发展的影响。结果表明,为实现内河航运污染的有效治理,三个利益相关者的最优演化稳定性策略应为:上下游政府积极监管,航运公司使用清洁能源。三方初始概率和风险偏好的提高,有利于促进产业更快更稳定的发展,而合理的利润分配系数和补偿成本则可以促进内河环境治理体系的良性发展。此外,上下游政府和航运企业选择最优策略的概率与政府罚款呈正相关,与监管成本呈负相关。尤其是前景理论的应用,使得演化均衡的结果更加明显。而合理的利润分配系数和补偿成本可以促进内河环境治理体系的良性发展。此外,上下游政府和航运企业选择最优策略的概率与政府罚款呈正相关,与监管成本呈负相关。尤其是前景理论的应用,使得演化均衡的结果更加明显。而合理的利润分配系数和补偿成本可以促进内河环境治理体系的良性发展。此外,上下游政府和航运企业选择最优策略的概率与政府罚款呈正相关,与监管成本呈负相关。尤其是前景理论的应用,使得演化均衡的结果更加明显。

更新日期:2021-07-22
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