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The value of tunneling: Evidence from master limited partnership formations
Journal of Business Finance & Accounting ( IF 2.709 ) Pub Date : 2021-07-22 , DOI: 10.1111/jbfa.12557
Aaron J. Mandell 1
Affiliation  

Shareholders of publicly traded subsidiaries are potentially susceptible to expropriation (tunneling) by parent companies (Atanasov et al., 2010). A recent study suggests that this is particularly true among US master limited partnerships (MLPs), where there is often a substantial divergence between the control rights and cash-flow rights of parent firms, through their general partner interests (Atanassov & Mandell, 2018). Although the negative impact of tunneling on controlled firms is documented in the literature, little is known about the valuation consequences of tunneling for shareholders of parent corporations. Changes to the MLP agency environment over the prior two decades—namely, the allowance of modifications to a fiduciary duty under Delaware law and the introduction of incentive distribution rights—have likely increased the incentive and opportunity for tunneling and provide a rich setting for addressing this question. I examine the effects of changing tunneling incentives on stock returns of parent corporations announcing the formation of MLPs and document significantly higher announcement period returns for MLP formations after these changes, amounting to roughly $188 million of additional value for shareholders of forming corporations, on average. Considered in concert with additional testing, this suggests that parent corporation shareholders benefit from the increased ability to tunnel MLP assets.

中文翻译:

隧道的价值:来自主要有限合伙企业的证据

上市子公司的股东可能容易受到母公司征用(隧道)的影响(Atanasov 等人,2010 年)。最近的一项研究表明,在美国主要有限合伙企业 (MLP) 中尤其如此,在母公司的控制权和现金流权之间,通过其普通合伙人的利益,通常存在很大差异(Atanassov & Mandell,2018 年) . 尽管文献中记录了隧道对受控公司的负面影响,但对母公司股东的隧道估值后果知之甚少。过去二十年中 MLP 代理环境的变化——即,特拉华州法律允许修改信托义务以及引入激励分配权——可能增加了挖洞的激励和机会,并为解决这个问题提供了丰富的环境。我研究了改变隧道激励对宣布成立 MLP 的母公司股票回报的影响,并记录了这些变化后 MLP 形成的公告期回报显着增加,平均为成立公司的股东带来约 1.88 亿美元的额外价值。考虑到额外的测试,这表明母公司股东受益于增加的隧道 MLP 资产能力。我研究了改变隧道激励对宣布成立 MLP 的母公司股票回报的影响,并记录了这些变化后 MLP 形成的公告期回报显着增加,平均为成立公司的股东带来约 1.88 亿美元的额外价值。考虑到额外的测试,这表明母公司股东受益于增加的隧道 MLP 资产能力。我研究了改变隧道激励对宣布成立 MLP 的母公司股票回报的影响,并记录了这些变化后 MLP 形成的公告期回报显着增加,平均为成立公司的股东带来约 1.88 亿美元的额外价值。考虑到额外的测试,这表明母公司股东受益于增加的隧道 MLP 资产能力。
更新日期:2021-07-22
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