The Simultaneous Multiple Round Ascending Auction (SMRA) pioneered by Milgrom, Wilson and McAfee in 1994 has become a defacto standard auction mechanism for the award of radio spectrum for commercial mobile services around the world. The winning bid price in such SMRA spectrum auctions is of interest as it determines the valuation of the scarce resource by the mobile operators, and also indicates the revenue accrued to the governments as auction proceeds. We examine, using a cross-country panel dataset, the determinants of spectrum prices, of all the SMRA auctions held in about 25 countries during 1994–2019. Our findings indicate that reserve prices fixed by the auctioneer as the starting price of auctions and the competition in the auction are the two variables that significantly affect the winning bid prices positively in SMRA auctions. The effect of reserve prices is more pronounced in regional auctions held in countries such as the U.S. and India. Further, the larger the amount of spectrum put on auction, lesser is the winning bid price, thereby indicating the traditional supply-demand relationship. Based on these findings, we provide policy prescriptions on fixing appropriate reserve prices, providing a clear visibility of spectrum availability, and increasing competition in mobile services for effective use of scarce radio spectrum.

由 Milgrom、Wilson 和McAfee开创的同时多轮升价拍卖 (SMRA)1994 年已成为授予全球商业移动服务无线电频谱的事实上的标准拍卖机制。此类 SMRA 频谱拍卖中的中标价格很有趣，因为它决定了移动运营商对稀缺资源的估值，也表明了拍卖进行时政府应计的收入。我们使用跨国面板数据集检查了 1994 年至 2019 年期间在大约 25 个国家/地区举行的所有 SMRA 拍卖的频谱价格的决定因素。我们的研究结果表明，拍卖师确定的作为拍卖起拍价的底价和拍卖中的竞争是在 SMRA 拍卖中对中标价格产生显着积极影响的两个变量。在美国等国家举行的区域拍卖中，底价的影响更为明显 和印度。此外，拍卖的频谱数量越大，中标价格越低，从而表明传统的供需关系。基于这些发现，我们提供了关于确定适当的底价、提供频谱可用性的清晰可见性以及增加移动服务竞争以有效使用稀缺无线电频谱的政策处方。