Purpose

Based on the idea of part standardisation and product differentiation in lean management, this paper answers the question when integrate firms should choose market foreclosure to maximise profits by studying a two-tier supply chain, which contains three types of firms: suppliers, manufacturers and integrated firms. Moreover, the effect of the substitutability between final products and the competition among firms in the supply chain would be investigated from the perspective of dynamic analysis.

Design/methodology/approach

Considering the decision order of integrated firms and manufacturers in the downstream of the supply chain, the authors build three competition models. In each model, integrated firms compete with manufacturers in Bertrand–Nash fashion. And, suppliers compete with each other in Cournot fashion, so do integrated firms and manufacturers. The authors further discuss how the competitive relationship between firms affect the equilibrium result.

Findings

Numerical analysis reveals that under other conditions unchanged, the increased competition between downstream firms leads to the rise in the willingness of selling parts for integrated firms, while the increase in the number of suppliers has the opposite effect. In addition, due to the market change before and after the vertical merger, it may lead to the transition from profitable to unprofitable for the vertical merger.

Originality/value

This paper provides a theoretical analysis and managerial implication for integrated firms' market foreclosure decision. From the perspective of dynamic analysis, this paper demonstrates the result of vertical mergers and provides an explanation for the failure of vertical mergers.

中文翻译：

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何时选择具有可替代最终产品的市场止赎和垂直合并

目的

本文基于精益管理中零件标准化和产品差异化的思想，通过研究包含供应商、制造商和集成企业三类企业的二级供应链，回答了集成企业何时选择市场止赎以实现利润最大化的问题。公司。此外，从动态分析的角度研究最终产品之间的可替代性和供应链中企业之间的竞争的影响。

设计/方法/方法

考虑到供应链下游集成企业和制造商的决策顺序，作者构建了三种竞争模型。在每种模式中，整合型企业都以 Bertrand-Nash 方式与制造商竞争。而且，供应商以古诺方式相互竞争，集成公司和制造商也是如此。作者进一步讨论了企业之间的竞争关系如何影响均衡结果。

发现

数值分析表明，在其他条件不变的情况下，下游企业之间的竞争加剧导致集成企业的零部件销售意愿上升，而供应商数量的增加则产生相反的效果。此外，由于纵向合并前后的市场变化，可能导致纵向合并从盈利向不盈利的转变。

原创性/价值

本文为整合企业的市场止赎决策提供了理论分析和管理启示。本文从动态分析的角度，论证了纵向并购的结果，并对纵向并购的失败进行了解释。