ABSTRACT

Although there is much to commend in Sarch's Criminally Ignorant: Why the Law Pretends We Know What We Don't, in this piece, I invite Sarch to expand on his analysis by considering how English doctrine diverges from the US doctrine he takes as foundational, and raise some doubts by putting pressure on the theory of culpability that motivates his views on how ignorance supplies culpability. In particular, (a) I question his defence of a motive-insensitive theory of culpability, (b) set out some worries with Sarch's strategy of running theories of inculpation and exculpation together, and (c) suggest that he prematurely rejects motive-based explanations of why a person who is wilfully ignorant of an inculpatory proposition when performing the actus reus of a crime is as culpable as another who does the same thing with the requisite knowledge.

摘要

尽管在 Sarch 的《刑事无知：为什么法律假装我们知道我们不知道什么》中有很多值得称赞的地方在这篇文章中，我邀请 Sarch 扩展他的分析，考虑英国学说如何与他作为基础的美国学说不同，并通过对罪责理论施加压力来提出一些怀疑，这些理论激发了他对无知如何提供罪责的看法。特别是，(a) 我质疑他对无罪动机理论的辩护，(b) 对 Sarch 将罪责和无罪理论结合起来的策略提出了一些担忧，以及 (c) 建议他过早地拒绝基于动机的理论解释为什么一个人在执行犯罪行为时故意不知道有罪主张的人与另一个拥有必要知识的人一样有罪。