In a novel move against Russellianism, Heck (2014) has argued that reports of the form S believes that p are semantically opaque on the grounds that there are no other means in English to report psychologically individuated beliefs, such as those Lois Lane reports using the names ‘Superman’ and ‘Clark Kent.’ I show that there are several other ways to meet this need. I focus on quotational reports of the form S believes “p,” which philosophers have overlooked or mischaracterized. I argue that reports of this form are no more metalinguistic than those using the complementizer that. In both, the meaning of the report depends on the meaning, not the form, of the complement. Some distinguishing features of non-metalinguistic quotational reports are that their complements force “deictic shift” and have no transparent interpretation. Free direct speech and thought bubbles have the same properties. The “q-ascriptions” McCullagh (2017a) proposed to defend Russellianism against Heck are not in common use and on his account are unsuitably metalinguistic. The fact that quotational belief reports are opaque without being metalinguistic makes the Russellian thesis that the meaning of a name is its referent untenable, thereby undermining Russellianism about belief reports.

中文翻译：

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引用和其他不透明的信念报告

在反对罗素主义的新举措中，Heck (2014) 认为形式S 的报告认为 p在语义上是不透明的，因为英语中没有其他方式来报告心理上个体化的信念，例如 Lois Lane 报告使用命名为“超人”和“克拉克·肯特”。我展示了还有其他几种方法可以满足这种需求。我专注于S 相信“p ”形式的引用报告，哲学家们忽略了或错误地描述了这些报告。我认为这种形式的报告并不比那些使用补语的报告更元语言. 在这两种情况下，报告的含义都取决于补语的含义，而不是形式。非元语言引用报告的一些显着特征是它们的补语强制“指示转换”并且没有透明的解释。自由直接讲话和思想泡泡具有相同的属性。McCullagh (2017a) 提出的为罗素主义辩护以对抗 Heck 的“q-归因”并不常用，而且根据他的说法，元语言学是不合适的。引用的信念报告是不透明的而不是元语言的这一事实使得罗素主义的论点，即名称的含义是其所指的是站不住脚的，从而破坏了关于信念报告的罗素主义。