We find that mutual funds whose managers are socially connected with firm auditors hold more shares of these firms and generate superior portfolio returns. Cross-sectional results reveal that the relation between social connections and mutual fund stockholdings is more pronounced: when the social connections are stronger, when the auditor is in a better position or has stronger incentives to acquire private information, when the fund manager exercises more power, for small audit firms, for auditors in areas with poor investor protection, and for public firms with greater business opacity or private information. Other results are consistent with fund managers electing to schedule their corporate site visits to coincide with the fieldwork of their connected auditors, as would be expected if fund managers time their visits to meet with these auditors to facilitate information transfer. Additionally, we observe associations between fund trading prior to earnings surprises and audit opinions, and the presence of social connections between fund managers and firm auditors. Finally, we show that mutual funds and firms in which they invest tend to appoint connected auditors and pay them higher fees. Collectively, we document empirical patterns that would arise if socially connected auditors and mutual fund managers share information.

中文翻译：

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这是一个小世界：与审计师的社会联系对共同基金经理的投资组合决策的重要性

我们发现，经理与公司审计师有社会联系的共同基金持有这些公司的更多股份，并产生更高的投资组合回报。横截面结果显示，社会关系与共同基金持股之间的关系更为显着：当社会关系越强时，当审计师处于更好的位置或有更强的获取私人信息的动机时，当基金经理行使更多权力时，适用于小型审计公司、投资者保护较差地区的审计师以及业务不透明或私人信息较高的上市公司。其他结果与基金经理选择安排他们的公司实地考察以与其相关审计师的实地工作相一致的结果一致，正如预期的那样，如果基金经理安排访问时间与这些审计员会面以促进信息传递。此外，我们观察到收益意外前的基金交易与审计意见之间的关联，以及基金经理和公司审计师之间存在的社会联系。最后，我们表明共同基金和他们投资的公司倾向于任命关联审计师并向他们支付更高的费用。总的来说，我们记录了具有社会联系的审计师和共同基金经理共享信息时可能出现的经验模式。我们表明，他们投资的共同基金和公司倾向于任命关联审计师并向他们支付更高的费用。总的来说，我们记录了具有社会联系的审计师和共同基金经理共享信息时可能出现的经验模式。我们表明，他们投资的共同基金和公司倾向于任命关联审计师并向他们支付更高的费用。总的来说，我们记录了具有社会联系的审计师和共同基金经理共享信息时可能出现的经验模式。