De Neys (this issue) argues that the debate between single- and dual-process theorists of thought has become both empirically intractable and scientifically inconsequential. I argue that this is true only under the traditional framing of the debate—when single- and dual-process theories are understood as claims about whether thought processes share the same defining properties (e.g., making mathematical judgments) or have two different defining properties (e.g., making mathematical judgments autonomously versus via access to a central working memory capacity), respectively. But if single- and dual-process theories are understood in cognitive modeling terms as claims about whether thought processes function to implement one or two broad types of algorithms, respectively, then the debate becomes scientifically consequential and, presumably, empirically tractable. So, I argue, the correct response to the current state of the debate is not to abandon it, as De Neys suggests, but to reframe it as a debate about cognitive models.

德奈斯（本期）认为，单过程和双过程思想理论家之间的争论在经验上变得棘手，在科学上也变得无关紧要。我认为这只有在传统的辩论框架下才是正确的——当单过程和双过程理论被理解为关于思维过程是否具有相同的定义属性（例如，做出数学判断）或具有两个不同的定义属性（例如，自主做出数学判断与通过访问中央工作记忆容量）。但是，如果单过程和双过程理论在认知建模术语中被理解为关于思维过程是否分别用于实现一种或两种广泛类型的算法的主张，那么争论就变得具有科学意义，并且可以推测，经验上易于处理。因此，我认为，对当前辩论状态的正确回应不是像德内斯建议的那样放弃它，而是将其重新定义为关于认知模型的辩论。