This article argues that historians have overlooked and underplayed a major British strategic error, namely that Napoleon’s escape from Elba in February 1815 was a preventable calamity that put the hard-won victory of the sixth coalition at risk. It had the potential to change the course of history because the allied victory at Waterloo was by no means assured. All of the allies bear some portion of the blame for Napoleon’s escape, but none more so than the British, and especially the Royal Navy, which was the only allied service capable of preventing Napoleon’s escape. Instead, Lord Castlereagh prioritized coalition politics over Napoleon’s fate, and the navy prioritized the ongoing War of 1812 and demobilization over Mediterranean security. The British committed these blunders even though they knew that Napoleon was a flight risk, and even though the cost of reinforcing Napoleon’s guard was dwarfed by the cost of dealing with his escape.

本文认为，历史学家忽视并低估了英国的一个重大战略错误，即拿破仑于 1815 年 2 月逃离厄尔巴岛是一场可预防的灾难，使第六次联军来之不易的胜利处于危险之中。它具有改变历史进程的潜力，因为在滑铁卢的盟军胜利决没有保证。所有的盟国都对拿破仑的逃跑负有一定的责任，但最重要的是英国，尤其是皇家海军，这是唯一能够阻止拿破仑逃跑的盟军。相反，卡斯尔雷勋爵将联盟政治置于拿破仑的命运之上，而海军将正在进行的 1812 年战争和复员置于地中海安全之上。英国人犯了这些错误，即使他们知道拿破仑有逃跑的危险，