We use The Patents (Amendment) Act, 2002 in India as a quasi-natural experiment to identify the causal effect of higher incentives for innovation on a firm’s compensation structure. We find that stronger intellectual property (IP) protection has a sharper impact on the demand for managerial skill for technologically advanced firms. Firms that were a-priori above the industry median (in terms of technology adoption, more so for R&D expenditure) witness a rise in the share of managerial compensation by 1.3–8.3% higher than the rest. This effect is completely driven by firms between 5–8th decile with no effect on firms below the median or at the very top of the technological ladder. This observed “snail-shape” in the firms’ response to the IP shock is rationalised in a model where firms within an industry compete for patents by investing in managerial inputs. The observed increase in wage inequality can partly be attributed to a stronger performance pay for high-tech firms. Associatedly, high-tech firms invested more in technology adoption, started to produce more product varieties at higher quality, and filed for more product patent claims.

我们使用印度 2002 年的《专利（修订）法》作为准自然实验来确定更高的创新激励对公司薪酬结构的因果影响。我们发现，更强的知识产权 (IP) 保护对技术先进的公司对管理技能的需求有更大的影响。先验高于行业中位数的公司（在技术采用方面，研发支出更是如此）的管理薪酬份额比其他公司高 1.3-8.3%。这种影响完全由第 5-8 个十分位数之间的公司驱动，对低于中位数或处于技术阶梯顶端的公司没有影响。在企业对知识产权冲击的反应中观察到的“蜗牛形状”在一个模型中得到了合理化，在该模型中，行业内的企业通过投资管理投入来竞争专利。观察到的工资不平等加剧的部分原因是高科技公司的绩效薪酬更高。与之相关的是，高科技公司在技术采用方面投入了更多资金，开始生产更多质量更高的产品品种，并提交了更多的产品专利申请。