The 2020 Vertical Merger Guidelines set out the enforcement policy of the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission with regard to vertical mergers. The evaluation process centers on the elimination of double marginalization, raising rivals’ costs, and market foreclosure. The Agencies recognize that merger-specific efficiencies may save an otherwise objectionable merger. In this paper, our focus is on the welfare effects of vertical mergers in the presence of successive monopoly and bilateral monopoly. In both cases, a vertical merger is welfare enhancing, but the benefits may not be merger specific. We illustrate this proposition by examining contractual alternatives to vertical integration by merger. We argue that vertical integration may eliminate substantial transaction costs which are present in contractual alternatives. Consequently, a vertical merger may well be superior to these contractual alternatives.

2020 年纵向合并指南规定了司法部和联邦贸易委员会关于纵向合并的执法政策。评估过程的核心是消除双重边缘化、提高竞争对手的成本和市场止赎。监管机构认识到，特定于合并的效率可能会挽救否则会令人反感的合并。在本文中，我们的重点是在连续垄断和双边垄断存在的情况下垂直合并的福利效应。在这两种情况下，纵向合并都会提高福利，但收益可能不是特定于合并的。我们通过检查合并垂直整合的合同替代方案来说明这一主张。我们认为垂直整合可以消除合同替代方案中存在的大量交易成本。