This paper examines the impact of tax authority monitoring and enforcement on earnings informativeness. Using a staggered difference-in-differences design, I exploit the introduction of a new tax administration information system as a proxy for increased tax enforcement. The results imply that the informativeness of earnings improves with an increase in tax authority enforcement. Furthermore, I find that these results are concentrated in firms that are tax noncompliant, firms that are profitable and firms that have more severe income diversion and downward earnings manipulation. Additional tests show that tax expenses are more informative when tax enforcement increases. Overall, this study suggests that tax authority oversight engenders a positive effect on earnings informativeness by reducing the noise in earnings signals.

本文考察了税务机关监督和执法对收益信息的影响。使用交错的差异设计，我利用引入新的税务管理信息系统作为加强税收执法的代理。结果表明，收入的信息量随着税务机关执法力度的增加而提高。此外，我发现这些结果集中在不合规纳税的公司、盈利的公司以及收入转移和收入下降操纵更为严重的公司。额外的测试表明，当税收执法增加时，税收费用会提供更多信息。总的来说，这项研究表明，税务机关的监督通过减少收益信号中的噪音对收益信息量产生积极影响。