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The integrated information theory of consciousness: A case of mistaken identity
Behavioral and Brain Sciences ( IF 29.3 ) Pub Date : 2021-05-19 , DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x21000881
Bjorn Merker 1 , Kenneth Williford 2 , David Rudrauf 3
Affiliation  

Giulio Tononi's integrated information theory (IIT) proposes explaining consciousness by directly identifying it with integrated information. We examine the construct validity of IIT's measure of consciousness, phi (Φ), by analyzing its formal properties, its relation to key aspects of consciousness, and its co-variation with relevant empirical circumstances. Our analysis shows that IIT's identification of consciousness with the causal efficacy with which differentiated networks accomplish global information transfer (which is what Φ in fact measures) is mistaken. This misidentification has the consequence of requiring the attribution of consciousness to a range of natural systems and artifacts that include, but are not limited to, large-scale electrical power grids, gene-regulation networks, some electronic circuit boards, and social networks. Instead of treating this consequence of the theory as a disconfirmation, IIT embraces it. By regarding these systems as bearers of consciousness ex hypothesi, IIT is led toward the orbit of panpsychist ideation. This departure from science as we know it can be avoided by recognizing the functional misattribution at the heart of IIT's identity claim. We show, for example, what function is actually performed, at least in the human case, by the cortical combination of differentiation with integration that IIT identifies with consciousness. Finally, we examine what lessons may be drawn from IIT's failure to provide a credible account of consciousness for progress in the very active field of research concerned with exploring the phenomenon from formal and neural points of view.



中文翻译:

意识的整合信息论:一个错误身份的案例

Giulio Tononi 的综合信息理论 (IIT) 提出通过直接用综合信息识别意识来解释意识。我们检验了 IIT 的意识测量phi的结构效度(Φ),通过分析它的形式属性,它与意识的关键方面的关系,以及它与相关经验环境的共同变化。我们的分析表明,IIT 将意识与差异化网络完成全局信息传输(实际上是 Φ 衡量的)的因果效力的识别是错误的。这种错误识别的后果是要求将意识归因于一系列自然系统和人工制品,包括但不限于大型电网、基因调节网络、一些电子电路板和社交网络。IIT 并没有将这一理论的结果视为一种否定,而是接受了它。通过将这些系统视为意识的承载,IIT被引向泛心论的轨道。这种背离我们所知的科学,可以通过认识到 IIT 身份声明核心的功能性错误归因来避免。例如,我们展示了至少在人类的情况下,实际上是通过 IIT 与意识识别的分化与整合的皮层组合来执行什么功能。最后,我们研究了 IIT 未能为从形式和神经角度探索这一现象的非常活跃的研究领域的进展提供可信的意识解释可能得出的教训。

更新日期:2021-05-19
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