This was an appeal against a rape conviction. The appellant had met the complainant on a dating website. During a sexually explicit exchange of messages, he claimed to have had ‘the snip’. The complainant gave evidence that before they had sexual intercourse during a subsequent meeting at her home, she had sought an assurance that the appellant had indeed had a vasectomy. He assured her that he had. She made it clear that she did not want to risk becoming pregnant. He repeated his assurance, and the complainant proceeded twice to have sex with him without the use of contraception. The next day, the appellant sent her a message, telling her that he was still fertile. The complainant then discovered that she was pregnant and had a termination. It was the prosecution’s case that the complainant’s consent to sexual intercourse was vitiated by the appellant’s deception about having had a vasectomy and that even if he had genuinely believed that she had consented, such a belief was unreasonable. It was the defence case that a lie about fertility could not, as a matter of law, vitiate consent, even if relied upon by the complainant. In order to vitiate consent a deception had to go to the nature of the sexual act or be closely connected to the sexual act. In the present case the deception did not fit into either category. The decisions in Assange v Swedish Prosecution Authority [2011] EWHC 2849 (Admin) (deceit as to the wearing of a condom vitiated consent) and R(F) v DPP [2014] QB 581 (deceit as to intended withdrawal vitiated consent) could be distinguished on the basis that in those cases consent had been given on the basis that ejaculate would be prevented from entering the complainants’ vaginas, whereas in the present case that was not sought to be avoided. The appellant’s deceit went to the consequences of intercourse, rather than the performance of the act itself, and could therefore not negate consent. The trial judge ruled that a deception about fertility was capable of negating consent and the appellant was found guilty. He appealed against his conviction on two counts of rape (he had been convicted of further sexual offences, including rape, against other women but these did not form part of the present appeal).

中文翻译：

---

强奸、同意和关于生育的谎言：R v Lawrance [2020] EWCA Crim 971

这是对强奸定罪的上诉。上诉人在约会网站上认识了投诉人。在一次露骨的性信息交流中，他声称拥有“剪辑”。申诉人提供证据表明，在随后在她家中的会面中，在他们发生性关系之前，她曾寻求保证申诉人确实进行了输精管切除术。他向她保证他有。她明确表示她不想冒险怀孕。他重申了他的保证，申诉人在没有采取避孕措施的情况下两次与他发生性关系。第二天，上诉人给她发了一条信息，告诉她他还有生育能力。申诉人随后发现她怀孕并终止妊娠。在控方的案件中，申诉人对性交的同意被申诉人关于已进行输精管切除术的欺骗而无效，即使他真的相信她已经同意，这种信念也是不合理的。辩方认为，关于生育的谎言在法律上不能使同意无效，即使申诉人依赖。为了使同意无效，欺骗必须符合性行为的性质或与性行为密切相关。在本案中，欺骗不属于任一类别。Assange 诉瑞典检察机关 [2011] EWHC 2849 (Admin)（关于佩戴安全套无效同意的欺骗）和 R(F) v DPP [2014] QB 581（关于有意撤回无效同意的欺骗）中的决定可以区别在于，在这些情况下，同意是基于射精将被阻止进入投诉人的阴道，而在本案中并没有试图避免射精。上诉人的欺骗是针对性交的后果，而不是行为本身的表现，因此不能否定同意。初审法官裁定，关于生育的欺骗可以否定同意，上诉人被判有罪。他就两项强奸罪名对他的定罪提出上诉（他被判犯有进一步的性犯罪，包括强奸、