Work often entails up-front effort costs in exchange for delayed benefits, and mounting evidence documents present bias over effort in the face of such delays. This paper studies the implications for the optimal income tax. Optimal tax rates are computed for present-biased workers who choose multiple dimensions of labor effort, some of which occur prior to compensation. Present bias reduces optimal tax rates, with a larger effect when the elasticity of taxable income is high. Optimal marginal tax rates may be negative at low incomes, providing an alternative, corrective rationale for work subsidies like the Earned Income Tax Credit.

中文翻译：

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具有当前偏差的最优所得税

工作通常需要预先付出努力来换取延迟收益，而且越来越多的证据文件表明，面对这种延迟，人们对努力存在偏见。本文研究了对最优所得税的影响。最优税率的计算适用于偏向当前的工人，他们选择劳动努力的多个维度，其中一些发生在补偿之前。当前偏差降低了最优税率，当应税收入弹性较高时影响更大。低收入时的最佳边际税率可能为负，这为工作补贴（如劳动所得税抵免）提供了替代性的纠正理由。