We conduct a stated-choice experiment where respondents are asked to rate various insurance products aimed to protect against financial risks associated with long-term care needs. Using exogenous variation in prices from the survey design and individual cost estimates, these stated-choice probabilities are used to predict market equilibrium for long-term care insurance. We find that information frictions are pervasive. We measure the welfare losses associated with these three causes in a framework that also allows for selection. We show that information frictions reduce equilibrium take-up and lead to large welfare loss while selection plays little role.

中文翻译：

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长期护理保险：信息摩擦与选择

我们进行了一项陈述性选择实验，要求受访者对旨在防范与长期护理需求相关的金融风险的各种保险产品进行评级。使用来自调查设计和个人成本估计的外生价格变化，这些陈述的选择概率用于预测长期护理保险的市场均衡。我们发现信息摩擦是普遍存在的。我们在一个也允许选择的框架中衡量与这三个原因相关的福利损失。我们表明，信息摩擦会减少均衡吸收并导致大量福利损失，而选择作用很小。