Abstract Within the policy debate, there is a fear that large incumbent firms buy small firms’ inventions to ensure that they are not used in the market. We show that such “acquisitions for sleep” can occur if and only if the quality of a process invention is small; otherwise, the entry profit will be higher than the entry-deterring value. We then show that the incentive for acquiring for the purpose of putting a patent to sleep decreases when the intellectual property law is stricter because the profit for the entrant then increases more than the entry-deterring value does.

中文翻译：

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睡眠收购

摘要 在政策辩论中，人们担心大型现有企业购买小企业的发明以确保它们不会在市场上使用。我们表明，当且仅当工艺发明的质量很小时，才会发生这种“睡眠获取”；否则，入场利润将高于入场威慑值。然后我们证明，当知识产权法更严格时，为了使专利陷入困境而获得的激励会降低，因为进入者的利润增加的幅度超过了进入阻止价值。