Abstract This paper analyzes an entry-deterrence model in which the incumbent decides whether to invest in research and development (R&D) that promotes clean technology. We consider the case in which the entrant could benefit from a technology spillover and analyze the conditions that facilitate the incumbent’s entry-deterrence behavior. We show that higher levels of the spillover make entry more attractive compared to a standard entry game. In addition, regulator and incumbent prefer entry when the spillover from clean technology is sufficiently high and the cost of investing in R&D is relatively low. However, preferences are misaligned when the spillover and cost of R&D are low.

中文翻译：

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绿色技术投资和进入威慑

摘要 本文分析了一种进入威慑模型，在该模型中，现有企业决定是否投资促进清洁技术的研发 (R&D)。我们考虑进入者可以从技术溢出中受益的情况，并分析促进在位者进入威慑行为的条件。我们表明，与标准入门游戏相比，更高水平的溢出使入门更具吸引力。此外，当清洁技术的溢出效应足够高且研发投资成本相对较低时，监管机构和现有企业更愿意进入。然而，当研发的溢出和成本较低时，偏好就会错位。