This article develops an approach to discovery that is grounded in regulatory theory and administrative subpoena power. The conventional judicial and scholarly view about discovery is that it promotes fair and accurate outcomes and nudges the parties towards settlement. While commonly held, however, this belief is increasingly outdated and suffers from limitations. Among them, it has generated endless controversy about the problem of discovery costs. Indeed, a growing chorus of scholars and courts have offered an avalanche of reforms, from cost shifting and bespoke discovery contracts to outright elimination. Recently, Judge Thomas Hardiman quipped that if he had absolute power he would abolish discovery for cases involving less than $500,000. These debates, however, are at a standstill and existing scholarship offers incomplete treatment of discovery theory that might move debates forward. The core insight of the project is that in the private enforcement context — where Congress deliberately employs private litigants as the main method of statutory enforcement — there is a surprisingly strong case that our current discovery system should be understood in part as serving regulatory goals analogous to administrative subpoena power. That is, discovery here can be seen as an extension of the subpoena power that agencies like the SEC, FTC, and EPA possess and is the lynchpin of a system that depends on private litigants to enforce our most important statutes. By forcing parties to disclose large amounts of information, discovery deters harm and, most importantly, shapes industry-wide practices and the primary behavior of regulated entities. This approach has a vast array of implications for the scope of discovery as well as the debate over costs. Scholars and courts should thus grapple with the consequences of what I call “regulatory discovery” for the entire legal system.

中文翻译：

---

发现即监管

本文开发了一种以监管理论和行政传票权力为基础的发现方法。关于证据开示的传统司法和学术观点是，它促进公平和准确的结果，并推动当事人达成和解。然而，虽然普遍持有，但这种信念越来越过时并受到限制。其中，就发现成本问题引发了无休止的争论。事实上，越来越多的学者和法院提出了大量改革，从成本转移和定制的发现合同到彻底消除。最近，托马斯·哈迪曼法官打趣说，如果他拥有绝对权力，他将取消涉及金额低于 50 万美元的案件的证据开示。然而，这些争论，处于停滞状态，现有的学术研究对可能推动辩论的发现理论提供了不完整的处理。该项目的核心见解是，在私人执法的背景下——国会故意使用私人诉讼人作为法定执法的主要方法——有一个令人惊讶的有力案例，即我们当前的发现系统应该被部分理解为服务于监管目标，类似于行政传票权。也就是说，此处的发现可以被视为 SEC、FTC 和 EPA 等机构拥有的传票权力的延伸，并且是依赖私人诉讼当事人来执行我们最重要的法规的系统的关键。通过强迫各方披露大量信息，发现可以阻止伤害，最重要的是，塑造整个行业的实践和受监管实体的主要行为。这种方法对发现的范围以及有关成本的争论具有广泛的影响。因此，学者和法院应该努力应对我称之为“监管发现”对整个法律体系的后果。