ABSTRACT

How can we make rational decisions that involve transformative experiences, that is, experiences that can radically change our core preferences? L. A. Paul ([2014]. Transformative Experience. Oxford: Oxford University Press.) has argued that many decisions involving transformative experiences cannot be rational. However, Paul acknowledges that some traumatic events can be transformative experiences, but are nevertheless not an obstacle to rational decision-making. For instance, being attacked by hungry sharks would be a transformative experience, and yet, deciding not to swim with hungry sharks is rational. Paul has tried to explain why decisions involving ‘sharky’ outcomes are an exception to the rule. However, her putative explanation has been criticized by Campbell and Mosquera ([2020]. ‘Transformative Experience and the Shark Problem.’ Philosophical Studies 177: 3549–3565.). In this paper, I offer a different solution to this problem. Roughly, I argue that transformative experiences give rise a problem for rational decision-making only if the decision can lead to satisfying some of our (new) core preferences, but can also frustrate other (new) core preferences. I also argue that agents can partially project what traumatic transformative experiences are like.

摘要

我们如何做出涉及变革性体验的理性决策，即可以从根本上改变我们核心偏好的体验？LA Paul ([2014].变革经验. 牛津：牛津大学出版社。）认为，许多涉及变革性经验的决定不可能是理性的。然而，保罗承认，一些创伤性事件可能是变革性的经历，但并不是理性决策的障碍。例如，被饥饿的鲨鱼袭击将是一种变革性的体验，然而，决定不与饥饿的鲨鱼一起游泳是合理的。保罗试图解释为什么涉及“糟糕”结果的决定是规则的例外。然而，她的推定解释受到了坎贝尔和莫斯克拉（[2020]。“变革性经验和鲨鱼问题”的批评。哲学研究177：3549–3565。）。在本文中，我为这个问题提供了一个不同的解决方案。粗略地说，我认为只有当决策能够满足我们的一些（新）核心偏好，但也可能挫败其他（新）核心偏好时，变革性经验才会给理性决策带来问题。我还认为，代理人可以部分地投射创伤性变革经历是什么样的。