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Peer Effects in Legislative Voting
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics ( IF 7.966 ) Pub Date : 2019-10-01 , DOI: 10.1257/app.20180286
Nikolaj Harmon 1 , Raymond Fisman 2 , Emir Kamenica 3
Affiliation  

We exploit seating rules in the European Parliament to identify peer effects in legislative voting. Sitting adjacently leads to a 7 percent reduction in the overall likelihood that two Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) from the same party differ in their vote, but peer effects are markedly stronger among women, among MEP pairs from the same country, and in close votes. Using variation in seating across the two venues of the Parliament (Brussels and Strasbourg), we also show that peer effects are persistent: MEPs who have sat together in the past are less likely to disagree even when they are not seated adjacently.

中文翻译:

立法投票中的同行效应

我们利用欧洲议会的席位规则来确定立法投票中的同行效应。坐在一起导致来自同一政党的两名欧洲议会 (MEP) 成员投票不同的总体可能性降低 7%,但在女性、来自同一国家的 MEP 同行中以及在关闭投票。使用议会两个场地(布鲁塞尔和斯特拉斯堡)的座位变化,我们还表明同伴效应是持久的:过去坐在一起的欧洲议会议员即使坐在不相邻的情况下也不太可能产生分歧。
更新日期:2019-10-01
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