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E-governance, Accountability, and Leakage in Public Programs: Experimental Evidence from a Financial Management Reform in India
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics ( IF 7.966 ) Pub Date : 2020-10-01 , DOI: 10.1257/app.20180302
Abhijit Banerjee 1 , Esther Duflo 1 , Clément Imbert 2 , Santhosh Mathew 3 , Rohini Pande 4
Affiliation  

In collaboration with the Government of Bihar, India, we conducted a large-scale experiment to evaluate whether transparency in fiscal transfer systems can increase accountability and reduce corruption in the implementation of a workfare program. The reforms introduced electronic fund-flow, cut out administrative tiers, and switched the basis of transfer amounts from forecasts to documented expenditures. Treatment reduced leakages along three measures: expenditures and hours claimed dropped while an independent household survey found no impact on actual employment and wages received; a matching exercise reveals a reduction in fake households on payrolls; and local program officials' self-reported median personal assets fell.

中文翻译:

公共项目中的电子政务、问责制和泄漏:来自印度财务管理改革的实验证据

我们与印度比哈尔邦政府合作,进行了一项大规模实验,以评估财政转移支付系统的透明度是否可以在实施工作福利计划时增加问责制并减少腐败。改革引入了电子资金流,削减了行政层级,并将转移金额的基础从预测转变为记录的支出。治疗通过三项措施减少了泄漏:支出和索赔时间减少,而独立的家庭调查发现对实际就业和工资没有影响;匹配练习显示工资单上的假家庭减少了;地方项目官员自报的个人资产中位数下降。
更新日期:2020-10-01
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