当前位置: X-MOL 学术American Economic Journal: Applied Economics › 论文详情
Our official English website, www.x-mol.net, welcomes your feedback! (Note: you will need to create a separate account there.)
All the Single Ladies: Job Promotions and the Durability of Marriage
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics ( IF 7.966 ) Pub Date : 2020-01-01 , DOI: 10.1257/app.20180435
Olle Folke 1 , Johanna Rickne 2
Affiliation  

This paper addresses women's under-representation in top jobs in organizational hierarchies. We show that promotions to top jobs dramatically increase women's probability of divorce, but do not affect men's marriages. This effect is causally estimated for top jobs in the political sector, where close electoral results deliver exogenous variation in promotions across job candidates. Descriptive evidence from job promotions to the position of CEO shows that private sector promotions result in the same gender inequality in the risk of divorce. A description of male and female job candidates' household formations sheds some light on the mechanism behind this result. For most male candidates for top jobs, their promotion aligns with the gender-specialized division of paid and unpaid labor in their households. Many female candidates for top jobs live in dual-earner households and are married to older husbands who take a small share of parental leave. Divorce among women in top jobs occurs more often in couples with a larger age gap and a less equal division of leave, and in households in which her promotion shifts the division of earnings (further) away from the norm of male dominance. No divorce effect is found in couples that are more gender-equal in terms of having a smaller age gap and a more equal division of parental leave. We argue that norms and behavior in the marriage market hinder the closure of the gender gap in the labor market.

中文翻译:

所有单身女士:工作晋升和婚姻的持久性

本文解决了女性在组织层级中最高职位的代表性不足的问题。我们表明,晋升到最高职位会显着增加女性离婚的可能性,但不会影响男性的婚姻。这种影响是对政治部门的高层职位进行因果估计的,在这些职位上,接近的选举结果会导致候选人之间的晋升存在外生差异。从职位晋升到 CEO 职位的描述性证据表明,私营部门的晋升导致了同样的离婚风险中的性别不平等。对男性和女性求职者家庭结构的描述揭示了这一结果背后的机制。对于大多数担任高级职位的男性候选人来说,他们的晋升与其家庭中的有偿和无偿劳动的性别专业分工相一致。许多高级职位的女性候选人生活在双职工家庭中,并且嫁给了休一小部分育儿假的年长丈夫。女性担任高级职位的离婚更常发生在年龄差距较大且休假分配不太平等的夫妇中,以及在她的晋升使收入分配(进一步)偏离男性主导规范的家庭中。在年龄差距更小和育儿假分配更平等方面,性别更平等的夫妇没有发现离婚效应。我们认为婚姻市场的规范和行为阻碍了劳动力市场性别差距的缩小。女性担任高级职位的离婚更常发生在年龄差距较大且休假分配不太平等的夫妇中,以及在她的晋升使收入分配(进一步)偏离男性主导规范的家庭中。在年龄差距更小和育儿假分配更平等方面,性别更平等的夫妇没有发现离婚效应。我们认为婚姻市场的规范和行为阻碍了劳动力市场性别差距的缩小。女性担任高级职位的离婚更常发生在年龄差距较大且休假分配不太平等的夫妇中,以及在她的晋升使收入分配(进一步)偏离男性主导规范的家庭中。在年龄差距更小和育儿假分配更平等方面,性别更平等的夫妇没有发现离婚效应。我们认为婚姻市场的规范和行为阻碍了劳动力市场性别差距的缩小。
更新日期:2020-01-01
down
wechat
bug