I analyze how competition between localities affects tax breaks and business location decisions. I first use a geographic instrument to show that spatial competition substantially increases firm-specific property tax breaks. I then use this pattern to estimate a model of localities competing for mobile firms by offering tax exemptions. Incounterfactual exercises, restricting which levels of government can offer tax breaks has little effect on equilibrium business locations but lowers total exemptions by 30 percent. This suggests that local tax break competition primarily reduces taxes for mobile firms and is unlikely to substantially affect the efficiency of business location.

中文翻译：

---

竞相垫底？地方减税竞赛和营业地点

我分析了地方之间的竞争如何影响税收减免和营业地点决策。我首先使用地理工具来表明空间竞争大大增加了特定于公司的财产税减免。然后我使用这个模式来估计一个地方通过提供免税来竞争移动公司的模型。Incounterfactual 练习，限制哪些级别的政府可以提供税收减免对均衡的业务地点几乎没有影响，但将总免税额降低了 30%。这表明地方税收减免竞争主要是为移动公司减少税收，不太可能对营业地点的效率产生实质性影响。