Husserl famously retracted his early portrayal, in Logische Untersuchungen, of phenomenology as empirical psychology. Previous scholarship has typically understood this transcendental turn in light of the Ideen’s revised conception of the ἐποχή, and its distinction between noesa and noemata. This essay thematizes the evolution of the concept of mental acts in Husserl’s work as a way of understanding the shift. I show how the recognition of the pure ego in Ideen I and II enabled Husserl to radically alter his conception of mental acts, coming to understand them all in terms of genuine acts (doings or performances) in a way that had been essentially precluded for descriptive psychologists (Brentano, Natorp, and the early Husserl) so long as the pure ego was denied. This reading challenges a widespread assumption in the secondary literature that “mental act” is a merely technical term or misnomer.

中文翻译：

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行为心理学与现象学：胡塞尔论自我行为

胡塞尔著名地收回了他在 Logische Untersuchungen 中早期将现象学描述为经验心理学的描述。根据 Ideen 修订后的 ἐποχή 概念，以及它在 noesa 和 noemata 之间的区别，以前的学术研究通常已经理解了这种先验转向。本文将胡塞尔作品中心理行为概念的演变主题化，作为理解这种转变的一种方式。我展示了在 Ideen I 和 II 中对纯粹自我的认识如何使胡塞尔能够从根本上改变他对心理行为的概念，以一种基本上被排除在描述性的方式从真正的行为（行为或表演）的角度来理解它们。心理学家（布伦塔诺、纳托普和早期的胡塞尔）只要否认纯粹的自我。