The present study attempts to reconstruct Husserl’s account of empirical illusion and hallucination and disclose the significance of sense-deception in Husserl’s phenomenology. By clarifying the relation between the “leibhaftige presence” and “existence” of perceived objects, I shall be able to contend that illusion and hallucination are nullified, invalid perceptions. Non-existence or in-actuality is a form of invalidity: the Ungültigkeit of what demands its insertion in the totality of actual existence. Husserl elaborates an ex-negativo account of in-actuality, in which sensory deception refers to a modal modification, which is always relative and contextual in relation to the total nexus of experience in its intersubjectively validated and harmonious unfolding.

中文翻译：

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欺骗感：幻觉和幻觉是无效的、无效的知觉

本研究试图重建胡塞尔对经验幻觉和幻觉的解释，并揭示感觉欺骗在胡塞尔现象学中的意义。通过阐明感知对象的“leibhaftige在场”和“存在”之间的关系，我将能够争辩说幻觉和幻觉是无效的、无效的知觉。不存在或不真实是无效的一种形式：要求将其插入到真实存在的整体中的事物的不存在性。胡塞尔详细阐述了对不现实的前否定解释，其中感官欺骗指的是一种模态修改，在其主体间验证和和谐展开中，它总是与经验的总联系相关的和上下文相关的。