In this article I press four different objections on Forst’s theory of the ‘Right to Justification’. These are (i) that the principle of justification is not well-formulated; (ii) that ‘reasonableness and reciprocity’, as these notions are used by Rawls, are not apt to support a Kantian conception of morality; (iii) that the principle of justification, as Forst understands it, gives an inadequate account of what makes actions wrong; and (iv) that, in spite of his protestations to the contrary, Forst’s account veers towards a version of moral realism that is prima facie incompatible with Kantian constructivism. I then evaluate Forst’s theory in the light of a distinction made by Sharon Street between restricted and unrestricted constructivism. I show that Forst has reason to deny that it is either the one or the other, but he is not able to show that it is both or neither. I conclude that the arguments Forst advances in support of his constructivist theory of the right to justification entail that it is a metaphysical and comprehensive conception in the relevant, Rawlsian sense. Forst’s theory of the right to justification therefore fails to fulfil one of the main stated aims.

中文翻译：

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柯尼斯堡的法兰克福人：任何未来非形而上学康德的序言

在这篇文章中，我对福斯特的“辩护权”理论提出了四种不同的反对意见。这些是（i）称义原则没有很好地制定；(ii) 罗尔斯使用这些概念的“合理性和互惠性”并不倾向于支持康德的道德观；(iii) 正当理由原则，正如福斯特所理解的，没有充分说明导致行为错误的原因；(iv) 尽管福斯特提出了相反的抗议，但福斯特的叙述转向了道德现实主义的一个版本，即表面上与康德的建构主义不相容。然后，我根据 Sharon Street 对受限制和不受限制的建构主义所作的区分来评估福斯特的理论。我表明福斯特有理由否认它是其中一个或另一个，但他无法证明两者都是或两者都不是。我的结论是，福斯特为支持他的辩护权的建构主义理论而提出的论点意味着它是相关的罗尔斯意义上的形而上学和全面的概念。因此，福斯特的辩护权理论未能实现其主要目标之一。