Jürgen Habermas’ discourse theory of morality should be understood, in metaethical terms, as a constructivist theory. All constructivist theories face a Euthyphro-like dilemma arising from how they classify the constraints on their metaethical construction procedures: are they moral or non-moral? Many varieties of Kantian constructivism, such as Christine Korsgaard’s, classify the constraints as moral, albeit constitutive of human reason and agency in general. However, this constitutivist strategy is vulnerable to David Enoch’s ‘shmagency’ objection. The discourse theory of morality, by classifying the constraints on the metaethical construction procedure (principles (D) and (U)) as non-moral, can avoid this problem.

中文翻译：

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哈贝马斯建构主义：构成主义论点的替代方案

于尔根·哈贝马斯的道德话语理论应该从元伦理学的角度理解为一种建构主义理论。所有建构主义理论都面临着一个类似于 Euthyphro 的困境，这种困境源于他们如何对元伦理建构程序的约束进行分类：它们是道德的还是非道德的？康德建构主义的许多变体，例如克里斯汀·科斯加德的，将约束归类为道德的，尽管它们通常是人类理性和能动性的组成部分。然而，这种构成主义策略很容易受到大卫伊诺克的“shmagency”反对。道德话语理论通过将元伦理建构程序（原则（D）和（U））的约束归类为非道德的，可以避免这个问题。