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In CCP we trust … or do we? Assessing the regulation of central clearing counterparties in Europe
Capital Markets Law Journal Pub Date : 2019-12-16 , DOI: 10.1093/cmlj/kmz026
Hossein Nabilou 1 , Ioannis G Asimakopoulos 2
Affiliation  

As part of financial market infrastructures, central counterparties (CCPs) have long been deemed systemically important and are likely to gain in importance due to the regulatory developments mandating central clearing for an increasing number of financial products. This paper focuses on the regulation as well as the recovery and resolution of CCPs in Europe. The existing CCP regulatory framework consists of ex-ante measures, including, among others, capital and liquidity requirements, initial and variation margins, and loss sharing mechanisms. In addition, the European proposal for the recovery and resolution of CCPs (the Proposal) contains several ex-post regulatory measures mainly in the form of rules for recovery and orderly resolution. Having studied the prudential regulatory measures for CCPs contained in the European Market Infrastructure Regulation and the ex-post recovery and resolution measures of the Proposal, this paper puts a spotlight on the specific shortcomings of the existing and proposed rules, in particular in terms of misaligned incentives, externalities, collective action problems, and certain practical impediments, and concludes that it would be misguided to inordinately rely on ex-post measures. Highlighting the limitations of the recovery and resolution mechanisms, this paper proposes that given the systemic importance of CCP functions, it is critical to improve the ex-ante measures whose objective is to prevent the failure of a CCP, rather than ex-post measures, which kick in after its failure. Accordingly, recommendations for making such improvements are proposed.

中文翻译:

在 CCP,我们信任……还是我们信任?评估欧洲中央清算对手方的监管

作为金融市场基础设施的一部分,中央交易对手 (CCP) 长期以来一直被认为具有系统重要性,并且由于监管发展要求对越来越多的金融产品进行中央清算,其重要性可能会增加。本文重点关注欧洲 CCP 的监管以及恢复和解决。现有的 CCP 监管框架包括事前措施,其中包括资本和流动性要求、初始和变动保证金以及损失分担机制。此外,欧洲关于CCPs回收和处置的提案(该提案)包含了几项事后监管措施,主要以回收和有序处置规则的形式出现。本文研究了《欧洲市场基础设施条例》中对中央对手方的审慎监管措施以及《提案》的事后恢复和处置措施,着重指出了现行和拟议规则的具体缺陷,特别是在错位方面。激励、外部性、集体行动问题和某些实际障碍,并得出结论认为过度依赖事后措施会被误导。本文强调恢复和解决机制的局限性,提出鉴于 CCP 职能的系统重要性,改进旨在防止 CCP 失败的事前措施而不是事后措施至关重要,它在失败后启动。因此,
更新日期:2019-12-16
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