ABSTRACT Unabated protests in Manipur against India’s boundary with Myanmar and the lack of demarcation of some boundary pillars, despite the signing of the India-Burma Boundary Agreement in 1967, makes it an important case to study how center-state relations impact India’s foreign policy decision-making and implementation processes. Based on fresh archival material, this article explains why New Delhi refused to consult state governments in Northeast India before signing the boundary agreement, and the limiting consequences of such a top-down decision-making approach during the demarcation phase. A postcolonial entity that struggled to generate legitimacy in and assert sovereign control over the Northeast, India’s approach on this issue offers an opportunity to reflect upon the (limited) conceptualization of, and ongoing debates around, the idea of a ’state’ within foreign policy analysis.

中文翻译：

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“一英寸等于多少英里？” 中邦关系与 1967 年印缅边界协定

摘要 尽管 1967 年签署了印缅边界协议，但曼尼普尔邦反对印缅边界和某些边界支柱未划定的抗议活动有增无减，成为研究中央与国家关系如何影响印度外交政策决定的重要案例——制定和实施过程。本文基于新的档案材料，解释了为什么新德里在签署边界协议之前拒绝咨询印度东北部的邦政府，以及在划界阶段这种自上而下的决策方法的限制性后果。作为一个努力在东北部获得合法性并主张对其进行主权控制的后殖民实体，印度在这个问题上的做法提供了一个机会来反思（有限的）概念化和围绕，